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Abstract 
The increasing complexity of safety-critical applications has 
led to the introduction of decision support tools in the 
transportation and process industries. Automation has also 
been introduced to support operator intervention in safety-
critical applications. These innovations help reduce overall 
operator workload, and filter application data to maximise the 
finite cognitive and perceptual resources of system operators.  
However, these benefits do not come without a cost.   
Increased computational support for the end-users of safety-
critical applications leads to increased reliance on engineers 
to monitor and maintain automated systems and decision 
support tools.  This paper argues that by focussing on the end-
users of complex applications, previous research has tended 
to neglect the demands that are being placed on systems 
engineers.  The argument is illustrated through discussing 
three recent accidents.   The paper concludes by presenting a 
possible strategy for building and using highly automated 
systems based on increased attention by management and 
regulators, improvements in competency and training for 
technical staff, sustained support for engineering team 
resource management, and the development of incident 
reporting systems for infrastructure failures.  This paper 
represents preliminary work, about which we seek comments 
and suggestions. 
1 Introduction 
Automation has been widely proposed as a means of reducing 
the impact of operator error.  In consequence, ‘intelligent’ 
control systems have been introduced in many industries 
(such as energy distribution, healthcare, transportation, and 
financial services).  For example, agent based techniques have 
been developed that identify and respond to changing patterns 
in an operating environment without the need for human 
intervention.   Also, inferential reasoning, including Bayesian 
analysis, has been used to automated decision making under 
uncertainty [5]. Techniques such as these have enabled 
increasing levels of integration both between and within 
individual systems and collections of systems [11].    
 
These advances have come at a cost [12]. Increased 
automation has reduced the scope for operator intervention.   
Direct modes of control have been replaced by supervisory 
functions where, for example, railway signalers only 
intervene in response to abnormal conditions including the 
failure of system components.  A host of human factors 
concerns arise as a result [2].  It is difficult to create and 
sustain high levels of situation awareness when operators are 
not continually involved in application processes.   Increasing 
levels of integration also jeopardize an individual’s ability to 
understand the diverse subsystems that support complex 
infrastructures [13].  There may also be problems at shift 
handover when operators have to brief their colleagues on the 
state of automated systems that continually evolve over time.   
 
This paper looks beyond the operator and focuses on the 
teams responsible for installing, maintaining, and 
decommissioning safety-critical systems.  Increasing levels of 
automation have increased the impact of administration and 
configuration errors on complex systems [6].  With less scope 
for direct operator intervention, many industries rely on 
systems engineers to correctly set the parameters that govern 
automated control systems.   However, these teams often have 
relatively limited support.  They typically rely on command 
line interfaces with few tools for error detection and 
correction.  Unlike operators in many industries, systems 
engineers typically do not have access to the sophisticated 
simulation facilities that enable them to make mistakes and 
learn to administer application processes before they make 
changes to primary or secondary systems.   Even though there 
are relatively few international competency requirements for 
operators (for instance in the air traffic management or energy 
distribution industries), there is even less consensus over 
competency criteria for systems engineers.    
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 
two illustrates the need for research by three examples from 
the air traffic management domain. Section three suggests an 
approach to conducting useful research, and section four 
presents brief concluding remarks. 
 
2. Illustrating The Need 
 
This section motivates the need for research by analyzing 
three adverse events.  Two of these examples represent 
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serious recent accidents in air traffic management in 
European air space.  The third example did not result in any 
injuries or damage but helps to typify a class of failures that 
have relatively simple causes, but which are increasingly 
difficult to diagnose across multiple interacting sub-systems. 
 
2.1 Überlingen  
 
The Überlingen accident occurred on the 1 July 2002 when a 
Boeing 767-200 collided in mid-air with a Tupolov TU164M 
[3]. 71 people were killed. The identified direct causes of the 
accident centred on the Air Traffic Control Officer’s (ATCO) 
instruction to the Tupolov crew, which contradicted the 
Aircraft Alert/Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), and 
ordered them to descend into the Boeing 767, which was also 
responding to an ACAS warning to avoid the other aircraft. In 
constrast, we focus on the maintenance procedures at Zurich 
Air Traffic Control Centre (ACC) that created preconditions 
where the ATCO was likely to make a mistake. 
 
ACC Zurich upper airspace was divided both vertically and 
horizontally. The particular vertical division above flight level 
235 into two or three sector operations created particular 
problems for the operation of Revised Vertical Separation 
Minima (RVSM). RVSM was a European initiative to 
increase capacity by relying on new generations of avionics to 
reduce the required vertical separation between aircraft. ACC 
Zurich staff, therefore, developed a six hour plan to modify 
the flight plan processing system to simplify the upper 
airspace and support the implementation of RVSM. This plan 
affected a number of different systems: the radar data 
application; the multi-radar computer system; the flight plan 
data processing system for tower and approach control; the 
landing sequence computer; the departures and arrivals traffic 
system and the ground to ground phone system with 
neighbouring centres. A further consequence of these effects 
was that management began to prepare for the upgrade by 
issuing official instructions to describe the work. An 
additional memorandum also documented the impact that the 
work would have in requiring controllers to work in fallback 
mode without a visual Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA).  
 
ACC Zurich’s normal configuration for night operations was 
based around two controllers supported by two assistants. It 
was also usual for one of the ATCOs to leave the control 
room and rest in the lounge as soon as the amount of traffic 
decreased. Management knew about this practice and there 
was no apparent pressure to stop it hence there was an 
assumption of at least implicit acceptance. Even though there 
were additional systems managers to support the RVSM 
upgrade, the Chief controller did not brief his colleagues 
about the additional staff. In consequence, a single controller 
was placed in a situation where they believed they were 
responsible for the tasks associated with radar planning, radar 
execution, shift supervisor, and systems manager at a time 
when profound changes were being made to the technical 
infrastructure. 
 
The Zurich radar data processing system consisted of three 
main Thomson MV9800 computers. The first was used for 
primary operation, the second was held as a “hot standby”, 
and the third was used for test purposes and software 
development. The system has a visual and acoustical STCA 
(Short Term Conflict Alert). If the connection between the 
MV9800 and the controller workstation system is interrupted, 
as it was on the night of the accident, then the correlated radar 
image is lost. Controllers must use the fallback radar 
computer (fbRDPS). This means that the controller must 
manually correlate radar targets with flight plans. The 
maintenance work that led to the loss of the MV9800-ICWS 
link also deprived the controller of the visual Short Term 
Conflict Alert, although an audible alarm was available. By 
forcing the manual correlation of radar targets and flight plans 
and by removing the prompt visual STCA warnings, the 
controller was placed in a vulnerable position.  Hence, the 
interactions between staffing and the degraded technical 
infrastructure created the context in which the ATCO 
contradicted the ACAS advisory on the Tupolov. 
 
2.2 Linate 
 
On the 8
 
October 2001, an MD-87 collided with a Cessna 
525-A that had taxied onto runway 36R at Milan’s Linate 
Airport [1]. One hundred and fourteen people were killed on 
the aircraft along with four ground staff who were working in 
a baggage handling building, which was struck by the MD-87 
after the runway collision. The official accident report 
concluded that the Cessna’s crew had mistakenly crossed the 
active runway under low visibility conditions.  Again, 
however, the engineering of ground based systems played a 
significant role in the causes of this accident.   
 
In the past, the Linate air traffic control officers had been 
provided with an analogue Aerodrome Surface Movement 
Indicator (ASMI) radar system. Traffic increases had exposed 
the reliability and low definition of this system to a point at 
which ATM personnel began to look for an alternative. There 
was a plan to introduce a new Surface Movement Guidance 
and Control System (SMGCS) using video camera 
technology. The old AMSI system was, therefore, taken out 
of service three years before the accident. 
 
Plans to install the new system were jeopardized when the 
predecessor of ENAC (Italian Civil Aviation Authority) 
objected to the antenna location. They argued that the planned 
location would involve additional expense by constructing a 
temporary structure that would then be moved once a new 
tower was built. It was also argued that the proposed structure 
might hinder visibility and that there were few reported 
problems in handling ground traffic at Linate. There was also 
concern that the new system would not harmonize with other 
European initiatives.  
 
In July 2000, ENAV assumed responsibility for air traffic 
management operations at Linate. One side effect of this 
hand-over was that approval was finally granted for the 
development of the new SMGCS. The antenna was to be 
located in the same position as the previous ASMI radar. 
However, the accident occurred while the upgrade project 
was further stalled.  Mothballed hardware had to be re-
serviced before the new system could be delivered. Further 
problems arose because the runway incursion sensors had 
already been deactivated on taxiway R6. In consequence the 
ANSV argued that there was “no possibility” to confirm the 
positions of the various aircraft using technical aids on the 
morning of the collision. 
 
2.3 Failure of a Network Card 
 
Linate and Überlingen illustrate the role that systems 
engineering played in Europe’s two most serious ATM-
related accidents.  In contrast, the final case study considers 
an incident that did not result in any injuries or damage to 
aircraft.  It illustrates the increasing challenge faced by 
infrastructure teams who must diagnose the causes of 
complex interactions between multiple systems.   
 
This incident began when the backup mode was activated for 
the flight data processing system (FDPS) local area network 
at a major European airport. Aircraft already in the system 
were unaffected.  However, some of the flight data 
information was not displayed for aircraft entering the 
system.  The ANSPs engineers worked to restore system but 
could not determine the root cause of the malfunction.   The 
airport continued to operate but with capacity restrictions.    A 
multi-party team was formed among the engineers, the system 
suppliers and their sub-contractors. 
 
A similar, intermittent malfunction occurred two days after 
the first problems.  However, normal levels of operation were 
resumed after some suspected network components had been 
replaced and the system seemed to have stabilised. As before, 
engineers continued to work on identifying the root causes.  
This task was complicated because it proved to be very 
difficult to replicate the observed symptoms. After 28 days 
without any subsequent problems, the malfunction occurred 
once again.  The subsequent report into the failure noted that 
“the determination of capacity was based on continuous risk 
assessments of the system performance and the technical and 
operational mitigations put in place to ensure safe 
operations”.   As before, capacity was gradually increased 
once the system seemed to have stabilised.  Additional 
personnel joined the investigation team but they still faced 
significant problems identifying the causes of the problem 
given that the FDPS local area network was still in 
operational use. Monitoring systems were deployed and 
operational changes were introduced to ensure that aircraft 
were not in holding patterns during any potential future 
malfunction. 
 
 A subsequent malfunction again forced the system into a 
backup mode and flow restrictions were imposed. ATCOs 
were by now beginning to lose confidence in the systems 
infrastructure and the decision was taken to halt the use of the 
FDPS.   This time when the system went into a backup mode, 
ATCOs observed further problems.  Some working positions 
lost flight plan coupling on all aircraft while others only lost 
data for certain flights. The additional monitoring tools 
enabled the joint sub-contractor and ANSP engineering teams 
to diagnose an intermittent hardware problem associated with 
a network interface card. They were then able to replicate the 
fault on a standby platform. Capacity was gradually restored, 
together with ATCO confidence in the state of the underlying 
systems. 
 
2.4 Common Themes 
 
A number of common themes can be identified across the 
three incidents. In particular, it is clear that systems 
engineering played a significant role in the causes and 
contributory factors leading to failure.  It is also clear that the 
complexity of safety-critical systems in Air Traffic 
Management are imposing significant demands on the skills 
and expertise of engineering teams as they work to configure 
and maintain multiple, interactive systems. The previous 
incidents also reiterate the communications challenges that 
remain to be addressed across the industry. 
 
Communication with Operations: The Überlingen accident 
illustrates some of the hazards that can arise when operational 
staff  do not understand the impact that infrastructure changes 
can have upon their everyday tasks.  In this accident, the 
information was available but ATCOs failed to appreciate the 
significance of the documentation and management did not 
provide clear information about additional engineering 
support.   Looking beyond this specific accident, a more 
general problem is that the systems engineers often provide 
information about their activities in a language that cannot 
easily be understood by systems engineers.  Although this 
does not excuse situations in which ATCOs fail to read 
maintenance updates, there are often good reasons why 
operational staff do not follow dozens of pages of technical 
guidance at a level of detail that does not reflect their 
understanding of the underlying infrastructures.   
 
Our previous work has revealed many other incidents that 
have occurred when systems and operational teams do not 
communicate the extent of maintenance activities during shift 
handovers.  The third incident also illustrates how a series of 
malfunctions can undermine the confidence that operational 
staff have in their underlying systems.   This can, in turn, 
create further communications problems where end users 
continually interrupt systems teams to gain further 
information about the diagnosis of a fault.  Such concerns are 
understandable but they can erode the finite resources that are 
available to respond to infrastructure failures. 
 
Communication with Sub-Contractors: The third case study 
illustrated the impact that sub-contractors can have upon the 
diagnosis of systems faults.   The role of external, technical 
support is likely to become more and more important with the 
increasing sophistication of future infrastructures, such as 
those envisaged within the NextGen and SESAR 
programmes.  Few service providers have the technical 
resources to develop, implement and maintain the many 
different automated and decision support tools that are 
proposed within these initiatives.  In Europe there are further 
plans under the Single European Skies initiative for 
neighbouring countries to cooperate in the deployment of 
increasingly complex, infrastructures.  This will further 
complicate communications with, for instance, sub-
contractors that were initially employed by another state.   In 
the case study, described in previous paragraphs, there were 
strong communications between the various stakeholders.  
However, this is not always the case when, for instance, the 
best engineers are reallocated to subsequent projects once a 
system has been accepted by an end user.  In these 
circumstances, sub-contractors can struggle to martial the 
necessary expertise to diagnose faults in the systems that they 
developed.  Further problems occur when malfunctions arise 
from the interaction between systems that were developed and 
maintained by different external companies. 
 
Communications with Management: All three case studies 
illustrate the communications problems that can arise between 
management and systems engineers.   At Überlingen, there 
were precursor incidents under SMOP that were not acted 
upon.  The subsequent BFU report argued that this was 
indicative of failures in safety management.  Hence technical 
support staff could not easily anticipate the impact that their 
actions might have during this mode of operation.   At Linate, 
higher levels of management did not appreciate the technical 
significance of the ground infrastructures that were gradually 
eroded over time.   In the final incident, management were 
anxious to restore previous levels of service even though the 
joint engineering teams could not identify the root causes of 
the FDPS LAN malfunction.    
 
A number of wider concerns help to explain the general 
communications barriers that often exist between systems 
teams and higher levels within their own organisation.  In 
particular, there is an increasing trend to recruit Board level 
management from either operational or financial 
backgrounds.   There are very few engineers at the top level 
of European Air Traffic Management organisations; similar 
caveats can be raised across the safety-critical industries.  It 
should, therefore, not be surprising that in times of economic 
stringency we see safety budgets under increasing pressure 
with the consequent risk to infrastructure engineering. 
 
This paper focuses on Air Traffic Management.  However, 
similar concerns can be raised across many other industries.   
For example, previous studies of information technology 
failures in healthcare have revealed the same lack of 
understanding between systems engineers, clinicians, 
management and politicians [8].   
 
3. A Roadmap for Safer Systems Engineering 
 
Figure 1 provides a roadmap intended to support safer 
systems engineering.   Higher levels of management as well 
as regulatory organisations often underestimate the 
contribution that infrastructure support makes to the safety of 
complex applications.  In the past, engineers may only have 
had an indirect impact on safety because most applications 
only supported operational decision making.   ATCOs retain 
the right to ‘close the skies’ or adjust the amount of traffic in 
response to concerns over underlying systems [9].   However, 
this position cannot be sustained.  The next generation 
automated systems will stretch the ability of operational staff 
to directly intervene without decision support tools.   Even 
today it can be difficult for operational staff to accurately 
judge the capacity restrictions that can be used to offset the 
risks from malfunctions in the underlying infrastructure.  
 
Focus on 
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Previous Incidents 
 
Figure 1: A Roadmap for Safer-Systems Engineering 
 
The argument that management and regulators need to pay 
greater attention to the safety implications of infrastructure 
engineering is based around the previous analysis of our three 
case studies.  As mentioned, there is a need to redress the 
under-representation of technical staff at higher-levels in 
many industries.  If this is not done then there is little 
prospect of increasing safety margins beyond the absolute 
minimum necessary to meet regulatory requirements.  This 
raises particular concerns given the lack of regulatory 
expertise in key technical areas, including human factors and 
software engineering.   
 
A second waypoint in the roadmap is the need to identify 
competency and training requirements for systems 
engineering.   These are, typically, far less developed than 
those available for operational staff [4].  For instance, there 
are no existing studies into the reliability of competency 
assessments for engineering teams that can be compared to 
those for operational staff [10].  There is considerable 
international disagreement over the training and skills that 
should be required of engineering teams.  This disagreement 
is crystallised in the controversy over the future role of Air 
Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEP).  It is unclear 
whether increasing the levels of redundancy and automation 
in air traffic management, identified by the European SESAR 
and US NextGen programmes, will create a situation in which 
ATSEPs perform a purely technical function.  In this view, 
their role includes minimal intervention in the diagnosis and 
correction of potential faults.  Alternatively, the complexity of 
these integrated systems might create the need for more 
highly trained engineers with the skills and expertise to trace 
complex interactions across multiple interacting applications.  
The three case studies presented in the opening sections of 
this paper clearly show the need for integrated support across 
diverse areas, including but not limited to hardware and 
software systems, human factors and risk assessment as they 
relate to technical infrastructures. 
 
It is increasingly difficult for systems engineers to fully 
understand the impact that low level configuration changes 
might have at an operational level. In air traffic management, 
engineers are increasingly forced to focus on particular 
applications.  Teams that support Flight Data Processing 
Systems may have only limited involvement in the 
engineering of Voice Communications Systems and vice 
versa.   Specialist integration teams then help to support the 
interactions that arise at the interfaces between these different 
technical areas.   This helps to promote a detailed knowledge 
of the underlying infrastructures but also creates barriers to 
engineers developing a global picture of the higher-level 
operational environment.   It is time that regulators and 
management recognised the impact that these changes will 
have upon systems engineering; competency requirements 
must be carefully considered and documented if technical 
staff are to develop the skills necessary to support 
increasingly complex safety-related infrastructures. 
 
The competency and training of systems staff also raises 
issues of selection. In some European states there is a 
tradition that individuals who fail the initial training for 
ATCOs are then directed towards a career as ATSEPs.  This 
has a significant impact on the working culture when 
operational teams interact with support staff. It is also 
important to review the pay and conditions of systems 
engineers.  In particular, a shortage of operational staff has 
led some states to increase wages well beyond those of the 
engineering teams.  This undermines communications when 
two social groups develop. Further concerns also centre on 
the working conditions of systems and operations.  The 
working hours of ATCOs are strictly regulated.  However, 
similar constraints are not usually enforced for engineering 
teams.  In consequence, technical staff can work for extended 
periods on critical infrastructures; fighting against levels of 
fatigue that undermine concentration and problem solving 
capabilities [7]. 
 
Figure 1 identifies two further landmarks in the roadmap that 
are strongly related to the competency of engineering staff, 
which support safety-critical systems. The first of these 
waypoints supports team resource management (TRM) 
training for systems engineering. This is particularly 
important given the communications barriers that previous 
paragraphs have identified between operations, management 
and technical staff.  Significant advances have been made in 
helping promote cooperation between operational users – for 
instance through the use of simulation tools and training in 
the management of critical events. However, these techniques 
are not widely used to prepare engineers for the demands that 
are placed on them during infrastructure failures.  In contrast, 
many technical staff learn ‘on the job’ even in safety-critical 
environments.  It is normal practice to learn how to configure 
and maintain complex applications by setting up secondary or 
back-up systems that are only one-step away from live 
operations. This makes it difficult for engineers to 
deliberately simulate the faults that increasingly test the 
competence of infrastructure teams. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that systems engineers often find it difficult to 
coordinate their response to adverse events with operational 
needs and the resources provided by their sub-contractors and 
systems integrators.   In contrast, our approach argues for 
increased investment in training environments that help to 
develop team resource management skills in response to a 
range of simulated failures. 
 
The final landmark in our roadmap focuses on the exchange 
of lessons learned from the systems engineering of safety-
critical systems.   Previous sections have used reports into the 
Linate and Überlingen accidents to identify the role that 
systems engineering has played in previous mishaps.   These 
are rare documents; most infrastructure failures are seldom 
discussed beyond the organisations that suffer them.  
Political, economic and regulatory concerns limit the extent to 
which lessons are exchanged both within and between 
industries.   This forms a strong contrast with the multiplicity 
of incident reporting sites that support the exchange of 
information about operational problems.   The consequences 
of this can be seen in our third case study.   There are 
similarities between the FDPS LAN failure and problems 
suffered by the FAA’s Atlanta center during November 2009.  
Neither of the service providers knew of the problems 
suffered by their colleagues nor have there been any joint 
meetings to discuss the wider significance of these events for 
the safety of either SESAR or NextGen. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
In the past, systems engineering had a limited impact upon 
the safety of Air Traffic Management.   Operational staff had 
the ultimate responsibility for decision-making based on the 
information that was presented to them. Traffic flows were 
adjusted so that ATCOs could respond to potential failures; 
for instance by avoiding holding patterns and ultimately by 
‘closing the skies’ during potential system failures.  In the 
future this may not be possible. The complexity and 
integration of infrastructures within the NextGen and SESAR 
programmes will increase the operational reliance on 
computational tools. These innovations will significantly 
increase capacity.  They will also increase the importance of 
technical staff in installing and maintaining the supporting 
systems that help preserve the safety of future operations.  
 
This paper argues that by focussing on the end-users of 
complex applications, previous research has neglected the 
demands that are being placed on systems engineers.  We 
have illustrated this argument by identifying the technical 
contribution to three case studies; the Linate and Überlingen 
accidents and a less publicised failure in an FDPS LAN.   
These incidents demonstrate a range of communications 
problems between systems engineers, operational staff and 
more senior levels of management.   This analysis has been 
used to develop a roadmap for safer-systems engineering 
based on increase attention by management and regulators, on 
improvements in competency and training for technical staff, 
on sustained support for team resource management including 
engineers and on the development of incident reporting 
systems for infrastructure failures.   
 
Although our focus has been on Air Traffic Management, it is 
clear that many of our arguments can be applied to other 
safety-critical industries.  In related work we have identified 
similarities with the role of software engineering teams in 
healthcare informatics.   The increasing use of complex, 
programmable devices and the development of distributed 
electronic patient records has revealed the need for improved 
communication with clinical staff and with higher levels of 
management in order to improve patient safety. 
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